Do you think the PLA landing on Taiwan is China's biggest challenge? wrong! The real life and death situation is in Ukraine. Once Russia falls, NATO's gun will directly hit China's northwest border - China cannot afford to lose this battle.

In June 2025, the stalemate on the Ukrainian battlefield and the dynamics of the situation in the Taiwan Strait together constitute a complex picture of China's geopolitical security. Compared with the simple "crisis sorting", the strategic linkage behind the two major issues needs to be examined from a rational perspective.

Ukraine: Russia's strategic survival and China's security fulcrum

The current Ukrainian conflict presents the characteristics of "NATO systemized consumption". According to data released by the German Ministry of Defense, the Ukrainian army's recent drone operations against Russian long-range strike forces have reduced its strategic bomber mission execution capabilities by about 10%. For China, Russia's geopolitical value is reflected in:

- The stability anchor point of Eurasia: If Russia faces strategic pressure, NATO military presence may extend to Central Asia, which will have a potential impact on the security of China's "Belt and Road" land channel. The trade volume between the five Central Asian countries and China reached US$70.2 billion in 2024, and a stable surrounding environment is the basis of regional cooperation.

​- Energy cooperation stability: China-Russia "Siberian Power" natural gas pipeline plans to supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas in 2025, accounting for 20% of China's total imports. This energy channel, together with Central Asian pipelines and offshore LNG imports, forms a "three-dimensional network" of China's energy security, and fluctuations in a single direction can be hedged through a diversified layout.

Taiwan Strait: The value of chronic challenges and strategic patience

The core contradiction of the Taiwan Strait issue lies in the superposition of deep governance difficulties in the island's social on-site governance and intervention of external forces:

- Internal structural topics: The anxiety of young people on the island about high housing prices and lagging industrial transformation exists objectively, and some groups have a wait-and-see attitude towards the economic prospects. This social sentiment needs to be gradually guided through deepening cross-strait integration (the cross-strait trade volume exceeds US$300 billion in 2024), rather than a simple interpretation of opposition.

​- Changes in external intervention costs: The United States invests an average of about US$300 million in the Ukrainian battlefield (data from the 2024 US Congressional Budget Office), coupled with the interest pressure on US$37 trillion in Treasury bonds (annual expenditure exceeds US$1.1 trillion), its global strategic projection capabilities are undergoing a realistic test. This "strategic overdraft" provides a window for China to trade time for space.

China's logic of breaking the deadlock: a game thinking that transcends the "either this or that"

In the face of complex situations, China's response strategy highlights systemicity: 1. Energy security diversification: In addition to Sino-Russia cooperation, China's LNG long-term contracts with Qatar and Australia cover 45% of annual demand, and the proportion of natural gas imports in Central Asia is stable at 18%, forming a three-dimensional supply system of "onshore + sea" and "pipeline + LNG".

​2. "Comprehensive Solution" to the Taiwan Strait Issues: Deepen the integration of people's livelihood through the "Several Measures to Promote Cross-Strait Economic and Cultural Exchange and Cooperation", while curbing the "Taiwan independence" adventure through normalized military exercises and training. Data from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council shows that the number of Taiwanese compatriots who come to the mainland for internships in 2024 increased by 22% year-on-year, and the resilience of private exchanges continued to emerge.

​3. Construction of global governance discourse power: Advocate the "common security concept" on platforms such as the United Nations and the SCO, promote the political resolution of the Ukrainian crisis, and at the same time reiterate that the Taiwan Strait issue is China's internal affairs - this diplomatic strategy of "unification of principle and flexibility" is winning China's widespread understanding of the international community.

Conclusion: Shaping strategic initiative in dynamic balance

Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait are essentially different fields of collision between unipolar hegemony and multipolar order. China's strategic wisdom lies in respecting the complexity of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and firmly safeguarding the core interests of the country; seeing the United States' strategic overdraft, and not underestimating the stubbornness of external intervention. As scholars from the National University of Singapore said: "The essence of competition for big powers is a competition of governance capabilities - China is providing a 'non-confrontational' solution to complex geopolitical games through the endogenous driving force of 'development first'." This long-term strategic determination may be the key to breaking the deadlock.